State of Utah v. Richard A. Johnson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. Richard A. Johnson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joan C. Watt; Stephen W. Howard; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Counsel for Appellant.
J. Frederic Voros, Jr.; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Ann Rozycki; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Counsel for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Johnson, No. 20010709 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3421
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD A. JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010709-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7-201(1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING 
JOAN C. WATT 
STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
ANN ROZYCKI 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
Court 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD A. JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 20010709-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR CRIMINAL NONSUPPORT, A 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-
7-201 (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DENISE P. LINDBERG PRESIDING 
JOAN C. WATT 
STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER 
ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR. (3340) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone (801) 366-0180 
ANN ROZYCKI 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellant Counsel for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS JURISDICTION TO CHARGE A 
UTAH RESIDENT WITH VIOLATION OF A UTAH STATUTE FOR 
FAILING TO SUPPORT HIS NONRESIDENT CHILDREN 5 
A. Under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, Utah has 
jurisdiction over a prosecution charging a Utah resident 
with violating a Utah statute 6 
B. Most states exert jurisdiction over a resident defendant 
charged with criminal nonsupport of nonresident 
children 10 
1. Cases where the parent resides in the 
charging state but the children do not 10 
2. Cases where the children reside in the 
charging state but the parent does not 13 
CONCLUSION 17 
ADDENDUM A - Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of 
Jurisdiction 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Audain, 
366F. Supp. 710 (D. Virgin Is. 1973) 13, 16 
STATE CASES 
In re Alexander, 36 A.2d 361 (Del. Super. Ct.) 11,12 
Boudreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310, 989 P.2d 1103 14, 15 
Commonwealth v. Shook, 236 A.2d 559 (Super Ct. Penn. 1967) 12 
Eppv. State, 814P.2d 1011 (Nev. 1991) 13 
Osborn v. Harris, 203 P.2d 917 (Utah 1944) 10, 14, 15 
Poole v. State, 208 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1973) 14, 15 
Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335 (Utah 1997) 1 
Smith v. State, 4 S.W. 351 (Term. 1928) 13 
State v. Borum, 178 So. 371 (La. 1937) 12 
State v. Boudreaux, 1999 UT App 310, 989 P.2d 1103 10, 14 
State v. Chintalpalli,123N.E2d 111 (Ohio 2000) 16 
State v. Gantt, 548 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. App. 1996) 15 
State v. Jackson, 112 S.E.2d452 (W. Va. 1960) 13 
State v. James, 100 A.2d 12 (Md. 1953) 12 
State v. Johnson, 782 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. App. 1990) 11,12,16 
State v. Klein, 484 P.2d455 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) 14 
ii 
State v. Moss, 791 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990) 10 
State v. Paiz, 111 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App. 1989), 
affirmed 817 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) 13 
State v. Rosenstock, 1995 WL 723535 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1995) 12 
State v. Shaw, 539 P.2d 250 (Idaho 1975) 13 
State v. Sokolaski, 987 P.2d 1130 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) 13 
State v. Taylor, 625 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) 13 
State v. Warrick, 125 N.W.2d 545 (Neb. 1964) 13 
Sweetman v. State, 152 A. 588 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1929) 11 
Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska App. 1987) 13 
STATE STATUTES 
Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 530.050 (Michie 1990) 16 
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 568.040(1999) 11 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1999) 2, 6, 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-404(1999) 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-3 (Supp. 2001) 8, 9 
iii 
OTHER WORKS CITED 
44 A.L.R. 2d 886 § 10 (1955) 12 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 77 (1971) 13 
IV 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD A. JOHNSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010709-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for criminal nonsupport, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt 
Lake County, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1996). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Does the State of Utah have jurisdiction to charge a Utah resident with violation 
of a Utah statute for failing to support his nonresident children? 
The determination of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of 
law, reviewed on appeal for correctness, according no deference to the district court's 
determination. Schwenke v. Smith, 942 P.2d 335, 336 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Resolution of this case requires interpretation of the following: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1999). Jurisdiction of offenses. 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he commits, 
while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of another for which he 
is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; 
(b) the conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense 
within the state; 
(c) the conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an offense 
within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state; or 
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy 
to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this state and such 
other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct which is any 
element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within this state. 
(3) In homicide offenses, the "result" is either the physical contact which causes death 
or the death itself. 
(a) If the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death shall be 
presumed to have occurred within the state. 
(b) If jurisdiction is based on such a presumption, this state shall retain 
jurisdiction unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence that: 
(i) the result of the homicide did not occur in this state; and 
(ii) the defendant did not engage in any conduct in this state which is any element 
of the offense. 
(4) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of 
this state is committed within the state regardless of the location of the offender at the time 
of the omission. 
(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). Criminal nonsupport. 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or children 
under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the support of the spouse, child, 
or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a source other 
than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf. 
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
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(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in this state, any 
other state, or any court of the United States; 
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 
24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of wedlock whose 
paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been established in a civil suit. 
(5) (a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an affirmative 
defense that the accused is unable to provide support. Voluntary unemployment or 
underemployment by the defendant does not give rise to that defense. 
(b) Not less than 20 days before trial the defendant shall file and serve on the 
prosecuting attorney a notice, in writing, of his intention to claim the affirmative 
defense of inability to provide support. The notice shall specifically identify the factual 
basis for the defense and the names and addresses of the witnesses who the defendant 
proposes to examine in order to establish the defense. 
(c) Not more than ten days after receipt of the notice described in Subsection 
(5)(b), or at such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file 
and serve the defendant with a notice containing the names and addresses of the 
witnesses who the state proposes to examine in order to contradict or rebut the 
defendant's claim. 
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements of Subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) entitles 
the opposing party to a continuance to allow for preparation. If the court finds that a 
party's failure to comply is the result of bad faith, it may impose appropriate sanctions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information filed 13 December 2000 with criminal 
nonsupport, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (1999). R. 2-4. 
(The Information was amended 20 July 2001. R. 165-67.) Defendant moved to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction. R. 21-24. After a motion hearing, R. 214: 1-10, the court denied the 
motion "[b]ased on the plain language of [Utah's criminal jurisdiction] statute." R. 169-72 
(addendum A). This Court granted defendant's petition for interlocutory review, in which 
the State concurred. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an interlocutory appeal. Defendant has not been convicted or even bound over 
on the charged offense and retains the presumption of innocence. The facts recited here are 
taken from the probable cause statement in the Amended Information. 
Defendant is obligated to pay $674 per month in child support for two children pursuant 
to a divorce decree entered in the State of Alaska. R. 166. Between 1 March 1996 and 12 
December 2000, defendant should have paid $41,788, but paid only $2,664; the balance he 
knowingly and without just cause failed to pay. R. 165-66. The children are under 18 years 
old and in needy circumstances, or would have been in needy circumstances but for support 
received from sources other than defendant. R. 166. 
Defendant resides in Utah; his ex-wife and children reside in Alaska. R. 1, 22, 27. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State of Utah has jurisdiction to charge defendant, a Utah resident, with criminal 
nonsupport even if his children reside in Alaska. 
The plain language of the Utah criminal jurisdiction statute establishes jurisdiction 
under two subsections. Subsections (1) and (2) provide that Utah has jurisdiction if the 
offense occurred partly in Utah. Because defendant failed to write and mail support checks 
while residing in Utah, the offense occurred at least partly in Utah. Subsection (4) provides 
that a crime based on omission to perform a duty imposed by Utah law is committed in Utah. 
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Because defendant failed to perform a duty imposed by Utah law—supporting his 
children—the resultant crime was committed in Utah. 
No Utah case has addressed this issue. Defendant cites many cases, including two Utah 
cases, finding jurisdiction over a nonresident parent if the children reside in the charging 
state. These cases are inapposite because here the parent, not the children, resides in the 
charging state. The overwhelming majority of cases involving a fact pattern similar to the 
case at bar hold that the charging state has jurisdiction over a resident parent who fails to 
support his nonresident children. The few cases holding otherwise have been disavowed in 
their respective states or are otherwise of dubious authority. 
The trial court correctly found jurisdiction to charge defendant in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
THE STATE OF UTAH HAS JURISDICTION TO CHARGE A UTAH 
RESIDENT WITH VIOLATION OF A UTAH STATUTE FOR FAILING 
TO SUPPORT HIS NONRESIDENT CHILDREN 
Defendant contends that Utah lacks jurisdiction to prosecute him "for an omission or 
failure to perform a duty to support his children who reside in Alaska." Aplt. Br. at 6. 
Defendant reasons that the act of a crime of omission occurs in the jurisdiction where the 
duty to perform lies and that because "the children live in Alaska and an Alaskan court 
entered the order of support, the duty to perform lies in Alaska." Id. Defendant further 
asserts that Utah has no interest in the support of children who do not live within the State. 
Aplt. Br. at 7. 
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Defendant's argument fails under the plain language of the Utah criminal junsdiction 
statute. In addition, a strong majority of cases have held that the charging state has 
jurisdiction over a resident parent even if the children are nonresidents. The issue is one of 
first impression in Utah. 
A. Under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, Utah has jurisdiction over a 
prosecution charging a Utah resident with violating a Utah statute. 
Defendant, a Utah resident, is charged with violation of a Utah statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-7-201 (1999), for acts he committed—or omitted—while in Utah. The trial court 
correctly ruled that "[bjased on the plain language of the statute, the State has jurisdiction to 
prosecute." R. 170. 
Whether Utah has jurisdiction over the prosecution of a Utah resident for violation of 
a Utah statute is controlled by Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1 -
201 (1999). It states: 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he 
commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of 
another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; 
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy 
to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of both this state and such 
other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct 
which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs 
within this state. 
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(4) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by 
the law of this state is committed within the state regardless of the location of the 
offender at the time of the omission. 
Utah has junsdiction over defendant under two separate provisions, the "wholly or partly" 
rule found in subsections (1) and (2), and the "omission" rule found in subsection (4) 
"Wholly or partly" rule. Under the plain language of subsection (1 )(a), Utah has 
junsdiction over a cnme committed "wholly or partly" within the state. Under subsection 
(2), a cnme is committed partly within the state if the conduct constituting an element of the 
offense or a result constituting an element of the offense occurs in Utah. Here, defendant's 
conduct constituting an element of the offense occurred in Utah. 
The charged offense of cnminal nonsupport is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-
201(1). A person commits the cnme if: 
[ 1 ] having a spouse, a child, or children under the age of 18 years, 
[2] he knowingly 
[3] fails to provide for the support of the spouse, child, or children 
[4] when any one of them is . . . or would be in needy circumstances but for 
support received from a source other than the defendant... 
Because defendant resides in Utah, elements [2] and [3] occurred here. Defendant failed to 
wnte and mail support checks. It was in Utah that those checks were not wntten and mailed. 
Therefore, conduct constituting an element of the offense occurred in Utah. 
"Omission" rule. Subsection (4) also supports junsdiction. It states: "An offense 
which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by the law of this state is 
committed within the state regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the 
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omission." § 76-1-201(4). Here, the charged offense is "based on an omission to perform 
a duty imposed by the law of this state"—the father's duty to support his minor children, 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201 (l)(b) and § 78-45-3(1). Hence, without more, under 
the plain language of subsection (4), the offense was "committed within the state." 
Defendant's rule- Defendant argues "that in order to be prosecuted in Utah for 
criminal non-support, the children must reside in Utah." Br. Aplt. at 7. Defendant infers 
this corollary from the rule that "[w]hen a child resides in Utah,. . . Utah has jurisdiction to 
prosecute for criminal non-support... regardless of the location of the parent." Br. Aplt. at 
8. The State agrees that Utah has jurisdiction to prosecute a nonresident parent for 
nonsupport of resident children. In effect, this is the "result" half of the conduct-or-result 
disjunction found in subsection (2). But it does not follow, in logic or law, that because the 
state where the children (but not the parent) reside has jurisdiction over this offense, the state 
where the parent (but not the children) resides does not. The jurisdictional rule is not that the 
result must occur in Utah, but that the result or the conduct must occur here. 
Defendant's argument rests on the unspoken premise that if jurisdiction is proper in one 
state it is improper in all others. This premise is false. A crime may be committed "within 
the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction . . . " Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1 -404 (1999).l This circumstance bars prosecution in this state only if a prior prosecution 
1
 Utah Code Ann. ^6-1 -404 (1999) states: 
If a defendant's c luct establishes the commission of one or more offenses 
within the concurrent isdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction, federal or 
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for the same offense in another jurisdiction resulted in an acquittal or conviction or was 
improperly terminated. Id. Defendant does not claim that he was subject to any prior 
prosecution for this offense. Accordingly, the fact that Alaska or any other state may have 
concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute this offense does not bar a Utah prosecution. 
Defendant's reliance on the Alaskan support order, see Br. Aplt. at 6, is equally 
unavailing. The existence of a support order is not an element of the crime of criminal 
nonsupport. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201(1999). Moreover, every Utah father—not just 
those subject to child support orders—has a statutory duty to support his children. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-45-3(1) ("Every father shall support his child . ..") (Supp. 2001). 
Finally, defendant suggests that Utah has no interest in prosecuting a resident parent for 
not supporting nonresident children. Br. Aplt. at 14. Whether Utah has such an interest is 
within the discretion of the Legislature. But even if it were not, several policy reasons come 
to mind. Utah has an interest in preventing its residents from violating Utah criminal laws 
with impunity merely because their victims happen to reside out of state. Utah may 
legitimately seek to encourage parents to support their children. Utah may not wish to 
become a haven for parents fleeing their support obligations. Also, judicial economy favors 
state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in 
this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal, conviction, or 
termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined in Section 76-1 -403,and (2) the 
subsequent prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 
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a single prosecution for criminal nonsupport where the offending parent's children are 
scattered across several states. 
B. Most states exert jurisdiction over a resident defendant charged with 
criminal nonsupport of nonresident children. 
Defendant's position that a state lacks jurisdiction to charge its own resident with 
criminal nonsupport where his children reside out of state lacks case support. 
Nonsupport cases discussing jurisdiction fall into two categories: (1) cases like the case 
at bar where the parent resides in the charging state but the children do not; and (2) cases 
unlike the case at bar where the children reside in the charging state but the parent does not. 
Defendant relies primarily on cases in the latter category. 
1. Cases where the parent resides in the charging state but the children do not 
Utah courts have twice considered the issue of whether the state may prosecute a 
nonresident parent for failing to support children that reside in the state. See Osborn v. 
Harris, 203 P.2d 917, 921 (Utah 1944); State v. Boudreaux, 1999 UT App 310, t 22, 989 
P.2d 1103, discussed below. But Utah courts have never considered whether the state may 
prosecute a resident parent for nonsupport of nonresident children. 
Defendant cites two foreign cases involving the prosecution of a resident parent who 
failed to support his nonresident children. Both are of limited weight. Defendant places 
primary reliance on State v. Moss, 791 S.W.2d 501 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). In that appeal—in 
which the State of Missouri did not appear—the Southern District of the Missouri Court of 
Appeals held that Missouri could not prosecute a resident parent for failing to support 
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nonresident children on the theory that ''Missouri courts have no jurisdiction to prosecute an 
offense which occurs in another state." Id. at 503. 
However, only six months earlier, the Western District of the Missouri Court of Appeals 
held that a resident charged with nonsupport of nonresident children could be tried in 
Missouri. See State v. Johnson, 782 S.W.2d 827 (Mo. App. 1990). Subsequent legislation 
providing that a defendant may be prosecuted either in the county in which the child resided 
or in which the parent resided during the time the nonsupport occurred, Mo. Ann. Stat. § 
568.040 (1999), lends support to Johnson. 
The other case cited by defendant, Sweetman v. State, 152 A. 588 (Del. Ct. Gen. Sess. 
1929), is even weaker. In Sweetman, the Court of General Sessions of Delaware interpreted 
the state nonsupport statute to require that the complaint be filed in the county in which the 
children resided. Id. at 589. 
Sweetman was expressly disavowed fifteen years later by the Superior Court of 
Delaware in In re Alexander, 36 A.2d 361 (Del. Super. Ct.).2 The Alexander court held that 
2
 The Court of General Sessions of Delaware, in which Sweetman was decided, 
was that state's criminal tribunal in 1929. The Sweetman case came before the Court of 
General Session on appeal from a Municipal Court. 152 A. at 588. The Superior Court 
of Delaware was a civil court with limited appellate jurisdiction. In re Alexander was 
heard by the Superior Court in a habeas corpus proceeding. The Superior Court and the 
Court of General Sessions were both exercising appellate review in their respective cases, 
and both courts were presided over by one or two judges selected from the same panel of 
six judges. The weight of their conflicting decisions may therefore properly be 
analogized to that of different panels of the Utah Court of Appeals. See generally Paul 
Dolan, The Supreme Court of Delaware 1900-1950, Supreme Court of Delaware, at 
http://courts.state.de.us/supreme/historyl .htm (last updated May 7, 2001). 
11 
"a husband living in this State and subject to our laws, is liable in the jurisdiction in which 
he lives, regardless as to where the original desertion took place/' Id. at 366. It dismissed 
Sweetman as having been "clearly and solely based on Section 3535," a section "intended 
solely" to govern venue. Id. at 366.3 
Most criminal nonsupport cases involving a resident parent hold that "a father may be 
prosecuted for nonsupport of his minor children in the state of residence, even though the 
children are residing outside that state." 44 A.L.R.2d 886 § 10 (1955). See Alexander, 36 
A.2d at 364 (holding that support duties are "enforceable in that place where the person 
responsible for those duties was located"); State v. Borum, 178 So. 371,373 (La. 1937) ("The 
offense is committed at the place where the father may be found within the state, and not at 
the place of residence of the children."); State v. James, 100 A.2d 12,12 (Md. 1953) (holding 
Maryland could try criminally a "father living in the State on the charge of wilful failure to 
support his children who live in another State"); Johnson, 782 S.W.2d at 828 (holding that 
state may prosecute a resident nonsupporting parent with dependent in another jurisdiction); 
State v. RosenstocK 1995 WL 723535 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1995) ("The act or omission of 
failing to provide adequate support takes place where the criminal defendant resides because 
that is where a defendant's failure to perform the required act fairly can be said to occur."); 
3
 One other case involving a resident defendant, though not cited in defendant's 
brief, found no jurisdiction. See Commonwealth v. Shook, 236 A.2d 559 (Super Ct. Penn. 
1967). However, that case was based on the idiosyncratic venue provisions of 
Pennsylvania's bastardy statute. See id. at 418. 
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Smith v. State, 4 S.W. 351, 353 (Tenn. 1928) ("A person domiciled in this commonwealth 
is amendable to the statute, whether his minor child is here when the wrong upon him is 
committed") (quoting Commonwealth v. Acker, 83 N.E. 312,312 (Mass. 1908)); Government 
of the Virgin Islands v. Audain, 366 F. Supp. 710, 713 (D. Virgin Is. 1973) (offense of 
willfully neglecting or refusing to provide support "may be said to have occurred at the 
parent's residence or at the place where the child resides, or both"); State v. Jackson, 112 
S.E.2d 452,457 (W. Va. 1960) (holding that where nonsupport statute expressly stated that 
action may lie in county of nonsupporting parent, jurisdiction is proper even though children 
were out of state). See also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 77 (1971) (state may 
exercise jurisdiction over nonsupporting spouse if it has personal jurisdiction over that 
spouse or that spouse's property). 
2. Cases where the children reside in the charging state but the parent does not. 
The instant case does not involve the question of whether a nonresident parent can be 
prosecuted for criminal nonsupport in the jurisdiction where his children reside. Yet, except 
for Moss and Sweeten, the nonsupport cases cited by defendant all fall into this category. See 
Wheat v. State, 734 P.2d 1007 (Alaska App. 1987) (Arizona resident); State v. Shaw, 539 
P.2d 250 (Idaho 1975) (Nevada resident); State v. Taylor, 625 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1993) (Michigan resident); State v. Sokolaski, 987 P.2d 1130 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999) (Missouri 
resident); State v. Warrick, 125 N.W.2d 545 (Neb. 1964) (Texas resident); Epp v. State, 814 
P.2d 1011 (Nev. 1991) (Oregon resident); State v. Paiz, 111 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. App. 1989) 
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(Colorado defendant), affirmed 817 S.W.2d 84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Osborn v. Harris, 
203 P.2d 917 (Utah 1949) (Oregon resident); Boudreaux v. State, 1999 UT App 310, 989 
P.2d 1103 (Kentucky prosecution of Utah resident); State v. Klein, 484 P.2d 455 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1971) (Montana resident); Poole v. State, 208 N.W.2d 328 (Wis. 1973) (Arizona 
resident). Any statements in these cases about prosecution of a resident defendant are dicta. 
These cases hold that a nonresident parent maybe prosecuted where his children reside. 
Defendant attempts to extract from them the inverse rule: that a resident defendant may 
not be prosecuted where his children do not reside. However, as explained above, the latter 
proposition does not follow from the former. That a defendant may be prosecuted where the 
children reside does not prove that he must be prosecuted where they reside. In fact, several 
precedents on which defendant relies expressly eschew his preferred rule. 
For example, defendant cites Klein, 484 P.2d at 457, summarizing its holding 
parenthetically as follows: "offense of criminal non-support is committed where the children 
reside/' Br. Aplt. at 9. This summary implies that a defendant may only be prosecuted where 
the children reside—indeed, absent this implication the case does not aid defendant's 
position. Yet Klein disavows this very implication: "We do not suggest that the crime of 
nonsupport occurs only in the state where the children are living." Id. at 458. 
Osborn v. Harris is a Utah case involving the prosecution a nonresident defendant for 
failure to support his wife and children residing in Utah. 203 P.2d at 917-18. Defendant 
cites this case for the proposition that "the duty to support lies in the state where the children 
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are located." Br. Aplt. at 8 (citing Osborn, 203 P.2d at 920). Yet the supreme court, after 
stating this holding, went on to disavow the very rule defendant seeks to infer from it: 
We express no opinion upon what should be the ruling if the wife's selection of 
a particular state for residence was merely because she could cause him greater 
difficulty under its criminal statutes nor do we express any opinion as to 
whether or not he is guilty of a crime in both states. 
Osborn, 203 P.2d at 921 (emphasis added). See R. 104, n. 1. 
Similarly, defendant describes parenthetically the holding of Poole, 208 N. W.2d at 331 
as follows: "place where children reside, not place where parent resides, is location where 
crime of criminal non-support occurs." Br. Aplt. at 9 (emphasis added). Language similar 
to the emphasized portion does appear in Poole. See 208 N.W.2d at 331. Yet this Wisconsin 
opinion is not read so broadly in Wisconsin. Referring to the 1973 Poole opinion and a 
another Wisconsin case, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in 1996 stated, "We have no quarrel 
with either decision. Neither holds . . . that nonsupport statutes may be enforced only in the 
place where the persons entitled to support resided during the period the defendant is alleged 
to have failed to support them." State v. Gantt, 548 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Wis. App. 1996). 
Like other cases in this category, Boudreaux v. State did not involve a resident 
defendant and therefore is inapposite here. However, it merits comment because it is a Utah 
decision. Boudreaux was an extradition case. While residing in Utah, Boudreaux was 
indicted in Kentucky, where his child resided, for criminal nonsupport. Id. at % 2-3. He 
challenged his extradition from Utah to Kentucky on the ground that "Utah, rather than 
Kentucky, has jurisdiction over the collection of any child support arrearages . . . " Id. at f 
15 
22. This Court disposed of Boudreaux's claim in a single paragraph, citing no case authority. 
Here is the complete analysis: "However, Boudreaux is charged with criminal flagrant 
nonsupport under Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 530.050 (Michie 1990), and the civil collection 
of child support is not at issue. We thus reject Boudreaux's argument that Utah has 
jurisdiction over him in this Kentucky criminal nonsupport matter." Id. at f 22. 
Boudreaux's argument presupposed that Utah had exclusive jurisdiction over the 
prosecution; a rule that both Utah and Kentucky had jurisdiction would not have defeated his 
extradition. Read in context, then, this Court's holding goes no further than to affirm the 
principle—endorsed by both parties here—that the state where the children reside has 
jurisdiction to prosecute a nonresident parent for criminal nonsupport. 
The correct rule is one of concurrent jurisdiction, summarized in State v. Chintalpalli, 
723 N.E.2d 111,113 (Ohio 2000): "[T]he act of failing to provide support occurs in at least 
two venues: (1) the place where the defendant resides, see Rosenstock [cited above], and (2) 
the place where the defendant was required to perform a legal obligation." 
Finally, that defendant may be extradited by Alaska, see Br. Aplt. at 13, does not 
deprive Utah of concurrent jurisdiction over him. See Johnson, 782 S.W.2d at 828 
("Contrary to Johnson's assertions, there is nothing in the URESA statute to suggest that the 
remedies or procedures provided therein are exclusive."); Audain, 366 F. Supp at 712 
(holding that Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act "should not and does not 
exclude the alternative remedy of criminal prosecution for nonsupport" in the parent's state). 
16 
In sum, under the plain language of the criminal jurisdiction statute, and under the clear 
weight of relevant authority, Utah has jurisdiction to prosecute a Utah resident for violation 
of the Utah criminal nonsupport act even if, as here, his children reside elsewhere. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on \^iu\y 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
ANN ROZYCKI #7609 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801) 366-0541 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SANDY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
JOHNSON, RICHARD A., ; 
Defendant. ] 
> ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
1 MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK 
1 OF JURISDICTION 
) Case No. 001401011 
) Judge Denise P. Lindberg 
This matter came before the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg on May 18, 2001, at 2:00 p.m., 
pursuant to defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction. The State of Utah was 
represented by Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney General. The defendant was represented by his 
attorney, Stephen W. Howard. After hearing oral argument by the parties and reviewing the file, the 
court makes the following findings and order; 
FINDINGS 
1. Under Utah's criminal jurisdiction statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1), (2), and (4), an 
individual is subject to prosecution in this state if the offense is committed either in whole or in 
part within the state. An offense is committed partly within the state if any element of the 
offense occurs within the state. When an offense is based on an omission to perform a duty 
imposed by the law of this state, the offense is committed within the state regardless of the 
location of the offender. Based on the plain language of the statute, the State has jurisdiction to 
prosecute. 
2. The criminal nonsupport statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-201, provides that a person 
commits the crime of nonsupport in Utah if having children under 18 years, he knowingly fails to 
provide support. The statute does not address the residency of the children. 
3. Although the defendant's argument that Alaska, as the state where the children reside, has 
more interest in prosecuting the defendant than does Utah, and that the duty of support should lie 
solely where the children reside is not unreasonable; the court is not persuaded that Alaska's 
interest is exclusive, nor does it need to determine which state's interest is greater. The language 
of Utah's jurisdictional statute and criminal nonsupport statute do not facially impose the 
limitations the defendant seeks to have the court adopt. 
ORDER 
The court orders, therefore, that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction 
is denied. 
DATED this ^ 2 ~ day of 
DENISE P. L 
DISTRICTCO^JUDGE %*>\B 
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